Priming studies suggested that coming across particular images or words (e.g. “wrinkle”) could have surprising effects on behaviour (e.g. slower walking pace). Many laypeople found this hard to believe, but Daniel Kahneman told them off in no uncertain terms:
…disbelief is not an option. The results are not made up, nor are they statistical flukes. You have no choice but to accept that the major conclusions of these studies are true.
This has not aged well, as many of the priming studies subsequently failed to replicate. Kahneman’s injunction might hold for physics (where rigorous evidence often establishes seemingly bizarre results), but social science is different: our research methods are weaker and our intuitive understanding stronger. Disbelief is often very much an option.
Common sense shapes social science
Similarly, common sense is devalued within social science. There’s an implicit ideal that we should follow our research methods mechanically, without appealing to common sense. But our methods simply aren’t good enough for that to work, and our common-sense knowledge is too valuable to ignore. We must apply common sense at every stage of the research process, from deciding what to study to making sense of the results. In practice, most social scientists do this, but they should be more open and explicit about it.
Social science shapes common sense
There is also the reverse mistake: overlooking the influence of social science on common sense. These days, most well-informed people know that the prices of goods are determined by supply and demand, not simply by how much labour it took to produce them. But it’s easy to forget that this is thanks to economics. Common sense often absorbs research insights, and our failure to see this makes us underestimate social science’s achievements.
The root of the problem is that we view common sense as more passive than it really is – reflecting our general neglect of human agency. In fact, common sense challenges, complements, and learns from social science.



I think this is true about social psychology and maybe other areas of psychology, and maybe observations of people you commonly interact with ("stereotype accuracy"). I think it's mostly false when it comes to economics, industrial organization, political science, or demography.
Some examples where people's "common sense" break:
Many people seem to believe that their political vibes/instincts track political reality. This is true both among politico types and normal people who touch grass. And yet vibes usually perform worse than polls or prediction markets.
People believe that rising prices are downstream of CEO greed. This is obviously stupid because they're trying to use a constant to explain a delta.
People seem to believe that giving numbers to express uncertainty is bad because it creates a false sense of precision and/or because decision-makers don't understand numbers. And verbal expressions of uncertainty ("likely", "possibly", "definitely not") is better. Yet study after study as well as real-world use cases repeatedly demonstrates the complete lack of accuracy here.
Many scientific experts believe that their common sense/experience/metis gives them specialized knowledge and ability to make good probabilistic forecasts, without in fact doing any probabilistic forecasts as practice. And many people have the "common sense" that scientific experts are worth listening to on these questions, as opposed to people who make good arguments or have a track record of making good predictions on unrelated matters.This view imo takes a bunch of L's repeatedly.
Many educators have the "common sense" that "teaching to the test" is bad, repetition is bad, memorization is bad, learners should be more creative and "learn to learn" etc. All fake afaict, as demonstrated by numerous careful studies.
Many people (especially on Twitter) seem to believe that EAs and AI safety people are more anxious or neurotic than average. Yet study after study (as well as personal experience among ppl who know EAs) repeatedly demonstrates that EAs are noticeably less neurotic than either population averages or matched-demographic groups.
Is common sense just Bayesian priors?